

Political violence and terrorism have increased their negative effects on public order in recent years. This book draws attention to this issue, presenting in-depth analysis of recent events in many parts of the world in the context of international security, terrorism and radicalism. In addition, it will serve as a new and up-to-date resource for researchers who working on international security and terrorism around the world. It establishes links between the assessment of political violence and terrorism and the concept of security. As a result, it highlights the increasing importance of security, which is one of the biggest problem areas of our age.

Hasan Acar completed his Master's degree and doctorate at the Department of Political Science of Uludag University, Turkey, and is currently teaching at Gendarmerie and Coast Guard Academy. His work focuses on security, international politics, Turkish political life, and nationalism. Due to his success in the fight against terrorism, he was awarded the "Operation against Terrorism Medal Ribbon".

Halil Emre Deniz received his Master's degree from Pamukkale University, Turkey, in 2011 and his PhD from Erciyes University, Turkey, in 2018. He also received a journalism doctorate from Marmara University, Turkey, in 2019. He is currently working as a faculty member at the Department of Political Science and International Relations of Hakkari University, Turkey.

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Security Issues in the Context of Political
Violence and Terrorism of the 21st Century



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SECURITY ISSUES IN THE CONTEXT OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM OF THE 21ST CENTURY

Edited by Hasan Acar and Halil Emre Deniz

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PREFACE

One of the biggest problems of our age is undoubtedly the problem of security. This concept, which is among the most basic needs of human beings, has become a sensitive issue in the face of the speed of technological developments.

The process of change experienced by states and societies in the modern age has made it increasingly difficult to protect public order and to ensure public security. In an era where globalization is increasing at full speed and the world is getting smaller, security threats are not only bound by the internal dynamics of the country, but also the period in which external dynamics are effective.

Although societies differ in terms of their cultural, social, administrative and economic dimensions, some global events affect the future and security of societies all over the world. Just as an event in Europe can change the future and destiny of a society in Asia, on the contrary, terrorist-like incidents in the backward parts of the world can primarily affect public order and public security in developed countries. Therefore, the government's security policy is constantly trying to adapt to the age and experience in review.

In this work, especially with the participation of the political violence and radicalization concepts of very valuable academics, public order and public safety issues threatened by terrorist organizations are discussed.

Security and terrorism in the 21st century are undoubtedly major problem areas. Today's world has prepared for us a chaotic environment where relations are blurred and it is not clear where the threat will come from. In this process, living in a peaceful environment, both as a state and a citizen, brings with it some responsibilities.

This book evaluates the concepts of security and terrorism from the perspective of today's world. In this book, there are original and qualified studies on the concepts of security and terrorism. The transformation of terrorism in the 21st century is explained. Terrorism, which generally tries

to have an effect with hybrid structures, is now being supported by advanced technology.

This book is a resource for researchers interested in Political Science, International Relations and Security studies. It is also important in terms of explaining the concepts of security and terror in relation to the global and regional relations of today's world. We hope that it will be a helpful work for researchers and academics who will work in this field, both theoretically and through current events.

Hasan ACAR

Halil Emre DENİŞ

COUNTERING TERRORISM IDEOLOGICALLY: THE CHINESE TERRORISM STRATEGY CASE

A. İNCİ SÖKMEN ALACA*

1. Introduction

Terrorism, not being limited to a specific region or a specific state, but having impacts and consequences beyond a specific area, comprises one of the most important security problems for the stability of nation states and the international community. It is a threat to national unity and integrity, internal security and stability in the country in which it emerges. This threat can gain an international character as the ideology of the terrorist organization transcends national borders and receives support from foreign countries. Terrorism has emerged as a new method of warfare in today's world. Unfortunately, an effective and permanent way of struggling against terrorism, which is also classified as "Low-Intensity War" by many scientists, has not been found that could completely eliminate it from the world. While there is no consensus on the definition of terrorism yet, the covert support of states to terrorist organizations in the international arena makes the struggle become difficult.

Today, China, being the second economic power in the world, has been confronted with terrorist attacks in its own country in parallel with the developments in the international system. In the strategy document defining the national defense of the state, terrorism has always been described as an unconventional threat, and combating this threat has been made essential through cooperation both within the country and in the international arena. The three demons that China must fight are defined as radicalism towards national unity and territorial integrity (fundamentalism), and terrorism along with separatism.

The terrorist incidents that the Chinese government has faced since 1989 have been in the form of ethnic separatist terrorist acts inspired by radical

* Assoc. Prof. Dr., Istanbul Arel University, Istanbul, Turkey,
incisokmen@gmail.com, ORCID iD- <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2021-137X>.

Islamic views and are mainly concentrated in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous region. They are characterized as terrorist activities with the political aim of establishing a state in line with the radical Islamic (fundamentalist) principles and in the direction of independence, linked to the East Turkistan Islamic Movement outside the borders of China. One of the most worrying issues is that these activities gain an international character and are accepted as legitimate freedom movements. In addition, the separatist demands of the Tibetan Autonomous region, the activities of the esoteric sect Falun Gong established in 1992, and any views criticizing the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are also associated with terrorism.

The single-party system based on communist ideology implements a political regime that is not suitable for terrorist acts (such as free organization and propaganda found by terrorist organizations in democracy) due to its political ideological structure. The CCP was a state in isolation from the world until 1972, when it adopted a management style which has been shaping the society since its establishment in 1949 and has been able to intervene in the lives of the people. Having taken the events in the history of the country as its guide, China has described what people lived through in the period from 1922 to 1949, when the dynasty was destroyed and declared a republic, as threats to the national security of the state. Missionary activities in the country, military backwardness, the demands of local warlords for independence in the countryside, and the humiliation of China by the western states are the events of this period. Maintaining the unity of the country, preventing the independence demands of the autonomous regions with external influences, and making the state ideology and the party sustainable continue to be among the basic national security objectives. While describing terrorist acts as activities that receive external support and destabilize the country, it is also involved in institutional cooperation activities in parallel with the developments in the international system.

After September 11, 2001, China criticized the struggle of the Western states with military power against terrorist groups that exploited the radical Islam religion with military power. It did not take part in the military structure with broad participation established against the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization in Afghanistan and against the ISIS terrorist organization in Syria. China has constantly criticized the USA's war on global terrorism in its national media, and saw the West as responsible for the emergence of this terrorism and the ISIS organization. It emphasized that terrorist organizations are used as a tool of low-intensity conflict and as a foreign policy tool to wear down target countries. The call for jihad

against the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization and the international mujahideen created by the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Pakistan Intelligence Service (ISI) in Afghanistan against the USSR invasion; American support for Chechen terrorism against the Russian Federation; and the ISIS terrorist organization that emerged from Iraqi prisons after the American military intervention against the regime in Syria, where Russia is active are shown as examples for these opinions to emerge. The use of terrorist organizations in the great power struggle within the scope of covert operations worries China, one of the countries where the USA sees the biggest threat in the 2017 National Security Document. While terrorist attacks took place on the infrastructure construction on the “One Road, One Belt” route, which is the biggest trade route project it wished to realize, Chinese businessmen and citizens abroad started to die as a result of terrorism.¹ With justified security concerns, by legalizing the Chinese army and security forces to be active in the fight against terrorism in cross-border operations, it has started to apply itself to the same struggle with the West, which it criticizes.

Today, the policies implemented in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous region to suppress terrorist acts cause serious criticism in the world press in terms of human rights. The strategy of the USA to suspend freedoms after September 11, 2001 and to fight terrorism, provided China with the opportunity to implement this struggle in the Xinjiang region by suspending freedoms with the same harshness in the fight against terrorism in his own country. While the political ideology of the regime facilitated the adoption of such policies, its use of the technological opportunities of the country in the field of security also caused it to be evaluated as a new model that was criticized in the fight against terrorism (condemned by the report of the United Nations Commission on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination). It should not be forgotten that China's practices are not the only ones in the world, and Israel's policies towards Palestinian terrorism, which are partially similar, constitute the model type that the USA is considering to take as an example in Iraq and which some European countries are considering for solving the refugee problem. This article will focus on the anti-terrorism strategies that China has implemented against groups that it sees as a threat to its national security and the strengths and weaknesses of these methods.

¹ Refers to: Attacks on Chinese citizens outside Chinese borders between 2004 and 2016. Duchatel, M. (2016) *Terror Overseas: Understanding China's Evolving Counter Terror Strategy*, European Council of Foreign Relations Policy Brief, p. 3.

2. Model for Countering Terrorism Ideologically

The strategy for countering terrorism ideologically is based on the terrorist organization's identity formulation, political aim and mind world. It is a kind of political struggle between reality and newly constructed images. Many ethnic groups related to terrorism offer a new world vision regarding independence, separatism and identity. Mostly these ideas are helpful for legitimizing violence.

Since 2001, de-radicalization policies towards sensitive target group societies have been put into practice in order to prevent violence and terrorist facilities. State-society interaction and dialogue training programs, and education courses are examples of these kinds of policies. Within them the unique sample is Chinese counter-terrorism policy. The reason for its uniqueness is that there is compulsory ideological training in state buildings like prisons for an unclear time period. This method was used for all Chinese citizens in work camps during the period of the first founder Mao. In these camps, Chinese people learned the principles of the government inspired Marxism ideology.

Currently, some methods are being applied for specifically targeting groups related to separatism, terrorism and radicalism in autonomous regions of China such as Tibet and Xinjiang. Although the Chinese government explains this policy as being part of learning about Chinese citizenship, identity and solidarity principles, it has also been criticized as the abuse of human rights of specific ethnic groups. Without exception, terrorists and civil people of all different ethnic groups from the Han identity are kept involuntarily in these buildings. Brainwashing or indoctrination techniques have helped to prevent cases of terrorism, as we will see from the number of terrorist incidents, within one year. Let's begin to analyze the Chinese counter terrorism strategy.

3. Fundamental Particulars of the Chinese Strategy for Fighting Against Terrorism

The fight against terrorism is a strategic management process carried out by state units within the framework of short-, medium- and long-term plans and strategies to be formed by defining the causes, ideology, beliefs and ideas of terrorism at the national and international level. A national strategic challenge includes the processes of planning, organizing, executing and controlling all preventive strategies with a simultaneous and

holistic view. These strategies cover institutional structuring (security forces, intelligence agencies and other institutions with responsibility for counter-terrorism), legal regulations, international efforts, and social, economic, political and cultural areas. The ultimate goal is to save lives by preventing or reducing the number of terrorist attacks.

Ronald Crelinsten stated that the fight against terrorism can be built on five principles: being challenging, proactive, persuasive, defense-oriented and long-term as a combination of hard and soft power approaches. On the law side, the nature of the punishment is determined by creating a terror law within the legal framework. At the same time, the state can create and deploy new security forces, based on its legitimate monopoly on the use of violence. As a war model, military and paramilitary forces can carry out operations within and outside the country against terrorist cadres, terrorist base areas and support elements. They try to prevent terrorists from infiltrating the country by transferring border protection. A proactive approach is to implement measures that will prevent the terrorist from committing his act. The key element in the preventive struggle is to monitor terrorist acts through intelligence, and to identify financial resources and external support elements. The persuasive struggle includes psychological operations against target terrorist groups. The aim is to win hearts and minds through the perception method and to prevent terrorist acts from finding a base. This includes activities for eliminating feelings of revenge for the past that motivate terrorists and to show that terrorist acts are ineffective. The defensive approach includes increasing the security of target areas (government buildings, security forces, local living areas, and critical infrastructure facilities), controlling human mobility, and controlling the financial structure of the terrorist organization and the supply of weapons, based on past terrorist acts. The final approach is primarily related with focusing on reasons, by planning that it will come to an end in the long term, and to create solutions by means of policies (Crelinsten 2009, 2014).

It is possible to examine China's counter-terrorism strategy through the five approaches Crelinsten put forward. Within the scope of coercive measures, the framework of a legal struggle is determined by law. China's counter-terrorism legal system is constituted of the Constitution, penal code, national security law, anti-terror law, rules governing religious affairs, Supreme Court decisions on terrorism and extremism, the Public Security Service (the Chinese version of the US FBI system) and the Ministry of Justice. As of January 1, 2016, the new Anti-Terrorism Law in the country has been enacted as part of the Security Law, which was

implemented in 2015. In the third article of the law, terrorist acts (including government criticism of citizens from within the country and foreigners from abroad, street demonstrations, emphasizing the Uyghur or Tibetan identity, even though made peacefully, and separatist demands)² are defined as a rather broad set of actions.³ Even if it is not an actual act, a verbal criticism can be considered within the scope of terrorism. In the fourth article, "radicalism/extremism" is stated as the ideology on which terrorist acts are based, and it is emphasized that the Chinese state does not accept any kind of extremism (hatred, discrimination, incitement to violence with religious discourse) (HRW 2017 [web]). Since there is a death penalty in the country, crimes of espionage and treason, which are serious terrorist crimes, result in death.

Separatist and radical terrorist groups carried out a total of 242 terrorist attacks between 1990 and 2016. 128 of these attacks took place in the Sincan Autonomous region. Bus and train station bombings, knife attacks, bomb attacks against security forces, capturing the police station, taking hostages, and assassination of state officials took place. It has been stated that this was to make the lives of the people sustainable by ensuring security in the Sincan region, where the terrorist incidents are most intense (ChinaDaily 2019 [web]). With regard to national security, the country's most at-risk region in terms of religious separatism and terrorism is the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous region. Anti-terrorism policies have been heavily implemented in this region. Although this is an autonomous region, its rules are determined by Beijing. The law regulating the religious affairs specific to the region, the law on anti-terrorism measures and the law against radicalism are covered. After the intense campaign in the world press that the measures applied are against human rights, and the allegations made by Gay McDougall at the meeting of the UN Committee Against Racism with China in August 2018, due to the heavy criticism of retraining practices the Chinese state council information office published

² Uyghur Ilham Tohti, professor of Economics and Law at Central Nations University in Beijing, was sentenced to life in prison for his criticism of the Uyghur identity and the Chinese government's policy of repression in the Xinjiang region.

³ Refer to: For the 13 August 2018 China Meeting of the UN Committee Against Racism. <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23452&LangID=E>; and BBC (2018) "China Uighurs: One million held in Political Camps, UN told" (10.08.2019) <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-45147972> (Accessed 10.06.2019).

a document on March 29, 2019 describing the fight against human rights radicalism and terrorism in the Xinjiang Uyghur region. It is also stated in the document that all practices are in compliance with the existing laws and human rights stipulated by the constitution.

In the war model, which is the other element of the coercive measures, many soldiers, police and intelligence personnel have been assigned to the region. The Chinese army, Chinese paramilitary police force, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (Jinxing Production and Construction Corp) and ordinary people are included in the "four common security" structures (Julienne, Rudolf and Buckow 2015 [web]). These intense police forces, which can be seen by the public at every point, are trying to be a deterrent. Army units were deployed in important cities and at borders, without a confrontation between the Chinese People's army and the local population. Part of the army's air force is also located in the region. The most important city in the region is Urumqi. In Yamalike, located in the west of Urumqi, the military radar station can control the city. After the September 11, 2001 attack in the USA, border security was increased and more soldiers were sent to the region in response to Al-Qaeda terrorists that could come from Afghanistan to China. Although there is no obstacle for Uyghurs to be admitted for military service, there are very few Uyghur soldiers in the ranks. The second group is the most competent armed police force in terms of ensuring internal security. While local police do not carry weapons in other parts of China, there is an armed police force in this region. There are ex-soldiers in the police force who are displaced from the army. The number of soldiers and police in the region has caused it to have the appearance of a military city.

The third group consists of the Xinjing Production and Construction Corps, which was founded in 1954 to prevent civilian forces from revolt, and the Han Chinese are responsible for developing industry and agriculture. It is an effective employer in the region with its large number of employees. As a private institution attached to the state, its main duty is to protect the territory of the region on behalf of the state. In the past, the Soviet Union had an interest in the region because of the need for labor in its own country, and supported Uyghur nationalism. In 1962, many Uyghurs and Kazakhs, left China and went to the USSR with the aim to work. Due to these departures, the border was closed until 1991. However, against the danger of a Russian invasion of the region, a buffer zone was created by the soldiers in northern Xinjiang, and as the reserve force, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps was tasked with starting the

people's war if it was occupied (Bao 2018). Again, this corps has obligations to maintain order in a possible uprising.

People in the region make up the last group. This category of civilians includes Han Chinese who migrated to priority areas. According to the 2010 census, the total population of the region is 21.82 million; 45.84% of this population is Uyghur, 40.48% is Han Chinese, 6.50% is Kazakh, 4.1% is Hui and the rest has a share of 2.67%. The total ethnic population has been determined as 59.52%. The difference between the Han Chinese population and the Uyghur population in the region is very small (Toops 2016 [web]). This shows that the number of immigrants coming into the west of the country from 1949 to 2010 was at a significant rate. It can be thought that this group, as the people considered to be most important in the region by the Beijing government, supports the state in terms of intelligence in maintaining stability and order (Wayne 2008, 91-95).

The Chinese government urges the public in the region to provide information in cooperation with the administration to gather intelligence. If sufficient information cannot be obtained from the family members of a wanted person, neighbors are forced to report. The involvement of a family member in terrorist and separatist incidents results in a collective family punishment (Wayne 2008, 95-97). By applying intense pressure and punishment to the families of those who carry out these activities abroad but whose families are in the region, there is an attempt to discourage them from their activities abroad. In the report prepared by Amnesty International within the scope of educational activities in the Xinjiang region, this information can be obtained from the statements of individuals who search for their families (Amnesty International 2018 [web]). The fact that the local people constantly control each other makes it easier for the security forces to take precautions against possible underground organizations. While the Uyghur people are denouncing each other as part of a proactive approach, the Chinese government prevents terrorist activities based on separatism and radicalism from finding a popular base. Such practices are linked to the communist regime. During the Cold War, the people were forced to denounce each other constantly for the security of the regime and the communist party in the USSR and East Germany.


In 2016, Chen Quanguo, the head of the Xinjiang District Chinese Communist Party, launched practices that transformed the region into a police city under the intense technological system. The People's Security Unit, the Chinese version of the FBI, can easily obtain open-source

intelligence with the help of emerging technologies. All ethnic groups in the autonomous region were recorded in the data network with an artificial intelligence-based face-scanning program, closed-circuit cameras, and bio-coding by collecting DNA and sound samples (Lee-Wee 2019 [web]). QR codes are created for each family, and family information can be easily accessed when these codes are read. Foreigners coming to the region within the scope of large data are easily understood and constantly monitored until they leave the region. Communication and composition are kept under constant control and there is an attempt to particularly determine external support or connections. The prevailing opinion is that the events in Tibet and the Xinjiang region were carried out with external support, and for this reason, there is an attempt to achieve stability by isolating the region and cutting off communication with the world. Human traffic to and from the Xinjiang region can be easily monitored, and giving information to foreigners and the people of the region leads to accusations of espionage (Kuo 2019 [web]).

The negative policy within the scope of the fight against terrorism that has made the most impact in the world is the persuasive policies of the regime, based on psychological pressure, against the people of the region, forcing them to participate against their will. These policies are retraining schools or vocational training schools to ensure loyalty to the state and to teach correct thinking. As social engineering practices, they aim to reform the society in order to raise individuals who are loyal to the regime and the party. Practices that are also a part of the fight against radicalism have been taken from the cultural revolution practices in Chinese history. These schools, which teach Chinese people about the communist regime, loyalty to the founding leader Mao, and loyalty to the state, were built rapidly after 2016 in the Xinjiang region. The buildings, which were first denied by the regime and later described as vocational schools, constitute the most critical side of the regime's anti-terrorism practice. It shows that the buildings allocated to schools, whose number has been rapidly increasing over a short time, are planned to stay for the long term and to cover a wide audience. After the intense reaction from the UN and the international community, the local law of the Xinjiang region was amended in October 2018 and the job definition of vocational education institutions was made within the scope of 33 articles. The main goal is to fight radical ideology. It is also stated in the law that they will return to their families and society by being subjected to intensive training in the fields of teaching Chinese, learning the laws and functioning of the country, professional knowledge and skills, ideological education against radicalism, psychology and

behavior correction. This policy is legitimized by the definition of these buildings under the law (Westcott and Xiong 2018 [web]).

Table 1. Training centers in the Xinjiang Region



Source: AFP 2018 [web].

By examining the satellite photographs, these schools were actually perceived as prisons or concentration camps. The building features written in the tenders at the beginning of the state pages, and the hidden shots

taken during the construction in the region and published on YouTube⁴ reveal that they resemble prisons rather than schools. They are seen as part of the war to prevent extremism and separatism from finding a base among the people in the region. Although there is no exact information about those admitted to these schools, how long they were detained, and the timing of their return, the statements of those who dropped out were by women and men, and individuals from Uyghur, Kazakh and Kyrgyz ethnic groups between the ages of 18 and 70. Those who come from a country included on the list of dangerous countries to study, or make phone calls from this country, the families of those who live abroad and work for Uyghur independence, those reading and sending religious articles to others, those reading and sharing the articles of intellectuals arrested for their views, professionals such as religious officials, tradesmen, academics, farmers, teachers, and journalists who criticize the regime in mosques are known to be covered (UHRP 2019, 5-6).

Passed by 17 senators from the American Congress on August 31, 2018, the seven people responsible for this ongoing camping practice in China, were proposed to be covered by the "Global Magnitsky" law by the Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and the Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin.⁵ These seven authorized people are Chen Quanguo, the head of the Xinjiang District Chinese Communist Party; Shohrat Zakir, deputy of the Uyghur-origin Quanguo; the Communist Party organ United Front 9th Bureau Deputy General Manager Hu Lianhe; Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps Party Secretary Sun Jinlong; Xinjiang Production and Construction Commander of the Corps Peng Jiarui, another of Uyghur origin; Xinjiang region People's Congress Permanent Commission Party secretary Shewket Imin; and Xinjiang Political and Law Commission President Zhu Hailun. It is interesting that today's leader of China, Xi Jinping, Shohrat Zakir of Uyghur origin among these seven people, and Zhu Hailun of Uyghur origin were sent to these schools during the Cultural Revolution between 1966 and 1976 (Hirschberg and Scarr 2018 [web]). It is known that Deng Xiaoping, who opened many, was admitted to these schools three times due to his views on capitalism. According to the Chinese official statement, these schools are places where they teach doctrine to reinforce loyalty to the regime, the state and the ideology. In

⁴ For the video refer to YouTube "A Jail by Other Name: Xinjiang Re-education Camp for Uyghurs *Exclusive Report By Bitter Winter* (26 November 2018) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uQHuOfKgNsI> (Accessed 01.06.2019).

⁵ For the Global Magnitsky Law, refer to U.S. Department of State <https://www.state.gov/global-magnitsky-act/> (Accessed 01.10.2019).

the testimonies of the people who left, it was stated that they were subjected to continuous training on making the national anthem be heard, teaching Chinese history and the Chinese language, constantly criticizing themselves, changing their religious thoughts, following others and informing the authorities (Denyer 2018 [web]).

Efforts to persuade the public to cooperate with the regime, especially for intelligence gathering, are understood from the statements of the people who left the schools, which they attended assiduously. By dividing ethnic people into two groups, as friends and enemies of the regime, they try to increase the number of friends and isolate the enemies from the society. Two examples of the political rise of individuals ready to cooperate with the regime are Shohrat Zakir and Zhu Hailun, two Uyghurs who came from these camps and were held responsible for these practices. The camp practice and isolation policies can be seen as a natural and routine practice for the Han Chinese. They do not see it as a violation of human rights due to the fact that they were subjected to such training during the Cultural Revolution, because their families were torn apart, and they lived in a country isolated from the world. They thought that a persuasive method, by applying socio-psychological pressure, would prevent the development of separatist tendencies and radical religious views towards the integrity of the country.

Efforts to establish an independent state by the separatist movement were made twice in the region. The first East Turkistan Republic was established in Kashgar in 1933, and a year later, the Hui warlord in the region and the Chinese Communist Party joined forces. The Second East Turkistan Republic, which was established in the North Xinjiang region in 1944, was ended in 1946. All these independence movements were realized with Soviet, European and American support. Since there is no unified Uyghur ideology, Pan-Turkism, Uyghur nationalism and Radical Islamism are viewed with sympathy with regard to the people of the region. The historical separation tendencies of the people of the region, seeing the Chinese government as an invading colonial state in the region, and the support of foreign countries have caused today's Chinese government to decide to put more pressure on a regional administration isolated from the world.

In the fight against radical Islam, as the close neighbors of the region are Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Uyghur youth go to these countries with a call for jihad and receive an education in the camps, taking part in Al-Qaeda terrorist organizations and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement in

Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is stated by the American authorities that there are Uyghurs detained in Cuba's Guantanamo as members of both organizations in Afghanistan (Bernstein 2019 [web]), with more than 100 Uyghurs⁶ participating in the DAESH terrorist organization and fighting in Syria as foreign fighters, threatening the Chinese government with videos, and revealing Uyghur links with terrorist groups that exploit radical religion. The Eastern Islamic Movement showed itself in the region with the Baren uprising in 1990, declaring that it would have a holy war against Chinese power in Central Asia (Rudelson and Jankowiak 2004, 318) In 2002, with the efforts of China, the East Turkistan Islamic Movement was included in the list of terrorist organizations by the USA and the UN. This movement took part in the Syrian civil war as the Turkestan Islamic Party. The presence of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda terrorist organizations in Afghanistan and the events in Syria caused the Chinese government to implement a security regime in the nature of "Hard Power/Maximum Pressure". The ideology of such radical religious terrorist organizations is accepted as "sickly thought". It was thought that the skills of healthy thinking would be gained through education, and that the radical problem would be solved by fighting against radical ideology. Symbolic appearances, that is, men growing beards and women wearing burqas are prohibited. The burqa issue is also a security reason. For terrorists, the black chador or burqa is the easiest means of concealment for Al-Qaeda and its affiliated organizations, which do not use female terrorists. Banning this type of clothing facilitates safer tracking in the camera-controlled area.

The defensive approach is already emerging with the increase in the number of security forces in the Xinjiang Autonomous region. Human mobility is constantly controlled, and public security officials personally follow people, especially those coming from abroad, and narrow their range of action. Those who seem suspicious are questioned and there are attempts to prevent their actions. How arms support is provided to the region is also determined by the Chinese authorities. Drugs and arms from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Tajikistan are attempted to be smuggled into the Khunjerab region in the north of the region. The "Golden Crescent" drug traffic extending from Afghanistan to Iran via Pakistan reaches Guangzhou from Kashgar. Drugs have always been the most important source of finance for such terrorist organizations. With border controls, a

⁶ For foreign fighters and Uyghurs joining the ISIS terrorist organization in Syria, refer to Clarke, P. C. and Kan, R. P. (2017) *Uighur Foreign Fighters: An Under examined Jihadist Challenge*, International Center for Counter Terrorism, Hague.

serious struggle is taking place against the smuggling of weapons and drugs (Global Times 2017 [web]).

As a long-term strategy of struggle, efforts are made to solve the economic and social problems that cause terrorism and separatism. The region is rich in energy, uranium. Industry and agriculture are the livelihoods of the people of the region. One of the weakest points of the Chinese economy is the development difference between the west and the east. While serious investments have been made in the East, urbanization and modernization have occurred at an advanced level. Western regions have lagged behind. The primary policy of the government is trying to minimize social problems by reducing this development difference. Urban-rural and regional distinctions are attempted to be equalized by focusing on economic investments. Within the scope of the "relative deprivation" theory, improvements are made by fighting poverty.

Education in the mother tongue is provided to minorities in their schools. However, as learning Chinese provides better job opportunities, knowing two languages makes it easier for young people to find a job with better opportunities. Apart from the Xinjiang region, they continue to maintain their ethnic identity in different cities of China through Uyghur restaurants by means of gastro diplomacy. The presence of these restaurants also indicates that the government provides support in minority cultural policies.

China is a country that attaches great importance to international cooperation in the fight against terrorism, and has supported all the post-2001 resolutions passed as a permanent member within the UN Security Council. Within the scope of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization for the Central Asian region, it has placed three security problems (terrorism, separatism-radicalism) on the agenda of the organization, and tries to find a joint solution to the terrorist problems in the region with the member countries by establishing a terror center (Wei, Juanrong and Xi 2019).

Ming Hongvey, the first Chinese to be elected in the period 2016-2020, was the president of the International Police Service (Interpol). Taken from his post due to bribery, Hongvey tried to help the government to find the most sought-after criminals around the world. Even this assignment in the international arena reflects the determination of the multilateral and cooperative Chinese terrorist struggle (AA 2018 [web]).

A military base in Afghanistan was established after it was stated in the law on terrorism that the Chinese army could take active duty abroad. It has been approved to carry out intelligence operations, that is, inactivation activities, against persons wanted for terrorist crimes outside the territory of China. In addition, Chinese private military companies have been created to be assigned to protect economic projects abroad. Especially on the passage route of the 2nd Silk Road project, it has been deemed appropriate to have Chinese private military companies at the ports that are operated (Arduino 2018, 69-113).

4. Weak Aspects of Chinese Policy for Fighting Against Terrorism

Due to the cessation of terrorist attacks⁷ in the country after 2016, within the scope of the ideological struggle against terrorism, the school policy of re-education was considered to be successful. It can be argued that it is actually a successful model, because it is seen in the statements of the survivors that this socio-psychological pressure is perceived as "humiliating the ethnic and religious identity, glorifying Han nationalism". In some way, the pressure, denial and destruction of ethnic and religious identity can cause people to become more radicalized. After the events in the Iraqi Abu Ghraib prisons, the DAESH organization, which uses the most brutal techniques, emerged in the region. The Hamas terrorist organization was born from the repression in Israeli prisons, and their actions were more violent as suicide bombings. Schools may be the cause of the onset of more intense violence, not the end in the future.

Radical Islamic thought is seen as sickly thought that leads people to violence within the scope of the holy war, and stability is achieved by creating an isolated area within the borders of China. However, the birthplace of these ideas is not China. By keeping this ideology constantly alive, it affects many people in the world. Especially in Pakistan, there are over 10,000 religious schools that the state cannot control. Certain political regimes in the Middle East support such thought. The struggle with the ideological dimension of radical Islamic thought is a much wider issue that requires international cooperation. Jaish-e Muhammed, a member of the Pakistan-based Deobandi terrorist organization Mulla Masood Azhar, who

⁷ Refer to Global Terrorism Index 2017 <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-terrorism-index-2017> and 2018 <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-terrorism-index-2018> (Accessed 10.06.2019).

committed a terrorist crime in his own country and had sanctions imposed with a UN Security Council decision on the insistence of India, was prevented by the Chinese veto (Hashim 2019 [web]). The Pakistan-China strategic alliance continues even in an incident related to radical terrorism. However, despite its harsh stance on radical religious views, China's failure to consider certain terrorist organizations within this scope may weaken its support in this area in which it expects international cooperation.

Terrorist groups that refer to the extreme radical religion of Islam, which is seen as a threat to China, continue their activities as loose organizations in the Middle East, Central Asia and South East Asia⁸ (considering the recent Sri Lankan attacks) outside the borders of the country. Some of those who went to live in another country after heavy pressure from the Xinjiang region may be attracted to terrorist organizations. After the policies implemented by China in the Xinjiang region, the DAESH leader Baghdadi included Chinese targets within the scope of the organization and there were more than a hundred Uyghurs who joined this organization (South China Morning Post 2016 [web]). China, which criticizes military options in the fight against global terrorism and pays attention to not making itself a target for terrorist organizations by not interfering in their internal affairs, has now become the target of these organizations due to the news reflected in the world media. The attacks on Chinese citizens abroad, which have increased in recent years, can be seen as a result of these events. The Xinjiang Autonomous region is the main transit axis of the "One Road One Belt" project of the Chinese leader Xi Jinping. However, this project further covers Central Asia and the Middle East. Harming the Chinese government outside the country's borders has become easier, especially in regard to its economic goals. Railway sabotage demonstrates this intention. The increasing structure of the ISIS terrorist organization in Afghanistan has attracted China after Russia and the USA, and it has shown that with the military base it has established, it will also take part in the fight against these organizations (Farmer 2018 [web]). The terrorist organization that was fed runs the risk of being drawn into the target network.

Today, an increase in "Lone Wolf" style individual actions has started to be observed rather than an organized structure. Not only ethnic or religious

⁸ For the Uyghur Terror organization in South East Asia, refer to Kwok, Y. (2015) "Is There a Uighur Terrorist Buildup Taking Place in Southeast Asia?" Time, 28.12.2015 <https://time.com/4161906/uighur-terrorism-indonesia-thailand-islam-isis/> (Accessed 01.06.2019).

radical terrorist organizations, but also techno terrorist organizations (cyber terrorism) threaten the national security of countries. Algorithm security software based on artificial intelligence is always the target of cyber terror. Although smart cities have been created with the latest technology-based artificial intelligence, hackers or cyber terrorists can enter through an open door in the program and destroy the entire infrastructure of the city. With the electromagnetic bomb, which was planned to be made for the first time during the war periods, it may become easy to infiltrate the city and destroy certain targets by interrupting communications and image capture. Even the quantum computer system can crash the program when there is an open door. Security systems based on the digital system do not provide 100% security and can also create the weakest area of the city's security. However, today, like a laboratory, it has established a George Orwell (1961) style surveillance system on China's own people. With this system, the omniscience and surveillance system can also be disabled at a certain point due to the weakness of cyber space. All the collected data about the population can cause serious damage to manpower as soon as it is captured by a foreign enemy state through cyber theft. DNA data especially reveals the genomic map of the Chinese people in terms of genetics. It can facilitate the development of a biological weapon suitable for the people's own genetic makeup.

In addition, a country's domestic political practices have an impact on its foreign policy. China is a country that has always been viewed with suspicion and there is no clear decision on how it will rule the world when it becomes a world leader. The most important reason for thinking in this way is the single-party system of government based on Communist ideology. This management system has a management style that puts the party above everything else, stating that religion is not needed even when the party is present and that party members are more privileged than the people, and provides serious social control over the people. Complete obedience to the party, ideology, Xi Jinping leadership and core staff is the particular bearing that has the most importance. The political regime has tried to express itself to the world with the concepts of "unity of civilizations, unity between differences, [and] harmonious order" as its foreign policy discourse. In addition, the concept of the "Chinese Dream" is based on building a middle-class welfare society and establishing a strong, democratic and contemporary country by applying the socialism model specific to China (Jinping 2015, 66-67). While this dream was desired to serve as a model for developing countries, serious criticism began to be received regarding the policies in relation to different ethnic and religious groups with regard to the particulars of living with minorities

since 2016. Not only those relating to Uyghur minority groups, but also similar practices in Tibet and the Hong Kong Autonomous region also weaken the discourses of unity in diversity and harmonious order. Indigenous people from the Pacific Islands, like local people in Taiwan have been subjected to social and economic discrimination in the country by the Chinese Communist Party. The ruling Democratic Progressive Party's woman leader Tsai Ing-Wen declared that she would end the injustice by apologizing to those locals who were discriminated against in order to ensure social justice in the country after her election (Ramzy 2016 [web]). Because of the threat to their identity in Taiwan, they do not prevent the same indigenous people in the Pacific Islands from having negative thoughts against Han Chinese and the realization of Chinese foreign policy towards these islands at the desired level (Cole 2014 [web]).

Han Chinese identity, which has historically been subjected to Western and Japanese humiliation, shows that nationalism is above all else. Following very harsh policies on minority management may harm Chinese soft power policies in Central Asia, where the Turkish ethnic identity is concentrated, and in the Middle East and Africa, where the Islamic population is predominant. In order to achieve ambitious goals in foreign policy as well as national security, a human-centered counter-terrorism strategy would be more appropriate.

5. Conclusion

International terrorism is an instability and a security problem for all countries. Each country defines terrorist crimes within its borders and fights within a legal framework. It tries to maintain stability by developing economic, social and cultural policies. With developing technologies, terrorist organizations change their action and tactical forms, and they can survive by finding external government support and safe living spaces. Cooperation with other states through international organizations is another important element of the fight against terrorism.

China, the second most important economic power in the world, had to fight terrorist acts, even though its regime was based on a single party, being communist. Separatism, terrorism, and radicalism have been identified as three major security threats that must be tackled by the state. Since such events have occurred in the Xinjiang Autonomous region so far, anti-terrorism strategies put into practice have concentrated on this region. The redefined legal framework for the fight against terrorism, the strengthened security bureaucracy in the region, the fight against long-

term economic problems and, most importantly, the fight against discrimination and terrorism with its ideological dimension are taken as a basis. Within the scope of the ideological struggle, a program was initiated for the minority groups in the region under the name of re-education in order to adopt the practices of the founding leader Mao Zedong's ideology-party-leader dependency. While the security system of the region was rebuilt with technological tools, a serious data bank was created with biometric applications. Although the decrease in terrorist acts after its implementation can be measured in terms of the success of the model in the short term, foreign policy has also caused negative returns. In the long run, it will be clear whether the model is really successful or not.

Ideological reshaping in China contributed to the anti-terrorism strategies of the countries between military power and soft power in the world with its method of social struggle. Although this method received serious criticism in terms of human rights, it was seen as the most applicable method for both Tibet and the Xinjiang Autonomous region for the Chinese government. It is conceivable that this method could be used in the future within other autonomous regions that may pose problems.

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